AU/ACSC/0077/97-03

DOD INVOLVEMENT IN THE COUNTERDRUG EFFORT

CONTRIBUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

A Research Paper

Presented To

The Research Department

Air Command and Staff College

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements of ACSC

by

Major Kimberly J. Corcoran

March 1997

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. government or the Department of Defense.

Contents

Page

Illustrations

Page

Tables

Page

Preface

As an AWACS pilot from April 1994 to June 1996, I flew dozens of counterdrug sorties. I enjoyed flying them, but often wondered whether we were wasting our time (and the government's money). I liked counterdrug sorties because I always got an air refueling (often at night) and I enjoyed the challenge and freedom of flying Due Regard (which means we maintained our own separation from other air traffic and did not talk to air traffic control agencies) over the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean. At the same time, I noticed that in hours of flying, we rarely identified even one suspected drug trafficker and when we did, we were often limited in our ability to follow it. Additionally, drug sorties provided training for only half of the AWACS mission crew, the surveillance section. The weapons controllers, who contribute the bread and butter of the AWACS combat mission, did not fly counterdrug sorties. To me this seemed to represent a poor utilization of resources: we were flying lots of sorties, but we hardly ever helped catch bad guys and the counterdrug sorties were being taken from the limited sorties available, thus reducing the opportunities to maintain combat readiness by flying training sorties.

Despite our lack of success in finding drug traffickers, I became keenly aware that we were only a small part of the ongoing counterdrug interdiction effort. An AWACS pilot wiles away the hours on long missions by monitoring the mission crew's radios, in addition to performing the standard pilot duties of monitoring cockpit instruments. As I

listened, I could hear "JIATF East," the controlling agency in Key West, Florida, coordinating the actions of numerous ships and aircraft on the net, as well as several ground agencies. I knew I was seeing only a small part of the big picture.

The ACSC research requirement provided me with an opportunity to educate myself as to the scope of the military's role in America's overall counterdrug effort and to determine for myself whether I think that effort is appropriate. I hope this research paper is useful for other military professionals who seek greater understanding of how the military's efforts fit into America's drug control strategy.

Several people provided valuable assistance to my preparation of this paper. Commander Rich O'Sullivan from the J-3 Counternarcotics Division at the Pentagon was an invaluable source of current documents and information. He also arranged for me to attend a quarterly interagency counterdrug conference hosted by the Counternarcotics Division. I also thank the Director of the Counternarcotics Division, Capt Dennis van Buskirk, USN, who generously provided the TDY funds for me to attend the conference. Finally, I thank my classmate, Major Lori South, who kindly agreed to proof read my paper for readability and typos.

Abstract

One of the major social issues facing the United States is the flow of illegal narcotics into our country. The costs of this illegal activity are significant. Costs can be measured in the lost health and productivity of individual users, as well as the costs required to fight the criminal activity perpetrated both by individual users and the large criminal organizations attracted by the profitability of the drug trade. These costs caused the U.S. Government to declare a "War on Drugs" in 1989 and to greatly increase the budget allocated to the interdiction of the drug supply. Since the DOD possessed numerous assets that were perfectly suited to interdiction operations, the DOD became heavily involved in the War on Drugs. This involvement was extensive from 1989 to 1993 and was instrumental in the successful capture of tons of illegal drugs. In 1993, the Clinton administration decided to shift the emphasis away from interdiction to other areas, and decreased the interdiction portion of the budget for FY94. This decrease has continued to the present and, according to some observers, has reduced the success of the DOD interdiction effort.

This paper briefly examines the extent of the overall drug problem in the United States, describes the DOD's contribution to America's drug control strategy and its challenges to success, and finally addresses why that effort, though useful, does not need to be increased to previous levels.

Chapter 1

Introduction

Drug abuse remained relatively uncommon in the United States until the youth movements of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Vigorous education campaigns were successful in reducing the use of heroin and other drugs in the 1970s, but in the 1980s the use of cocaine began a steady rise. The introduction of crack cocaine in the mid-1980s was associated with a sharp increase in drug-related crime. As constituents began to identify drug abuse as one of their primary concerns, Congress and the President began to focus more attention on the drug problem. This attention increased until, in 1989, President Bush introduced the concept of a National Drug Control Strategy, designed to coordinate the efforts of all the agencies involved in the "War on Drugs."

The military had assisted in counterdrug efforts for decades, but widespread military involvement did not begin until the early 1990s. From the beginning, military involvement in the drug control effort met with criticism. Many observers, both inside and outside the military, argued that military assets were being wasted. As time passed, and military operations other than war (MOOTW) became more common and more accepted, the criticism began to focus less on the use of the military and more on *how* the military was being used. More recently, observers have begun to criticize the reductions in the employment of the military that occurred in FY94, stating that our interdiction

efforts have become ineffective due to the reduction of assets employed. These critics fail to appreciate that the military plays only a minor supporting role in the complex multinational interagency counterdrug effort and has limited ability, regardless of assets employed, to affect the desired endstate of fewer drugs on the streets of America. This paper will demonstrate that while the military brings useful attributes to the drug control effort, it has only a small impact on the drug control strategy's desired endstate due to imposed legal limitations, as well as the inherent limitations of interdiction, especially in an international environment. Because of these limitations, and the fiscal realities of decreased Federal spending throughout the entire spectrum of government, the military's role in the counterdrug effort should not be returned to previous levels. Better results could be gained by spending additional funds in other areas, such as demand reduction, as we prosecute the fight against illegal drugs.

Before we can understand how the military fits into the overall counterdrug strategy, we must first understand the big picture. Therefore, Chapter 2 will briefly review the drug problem in the United States: its costs, the patterns of addiction, and the sources of illicit drugs. It will conclude with an overview of the National Drug Control Strategy. Chapter 3 addresses the military's role in the counterdrug effort, which is focused on interdiction. Finally, Chapter 4 highlights both the accomplishments and the challenges to success faced by the military and other interdiction agencies.

Chapter 2

The Drug Problem in the United States

In 1989, President Bush announced the formulation of a comprehensive drug control strategy under the command of a nationally appointed "drug czar." Despite the coordinated efforts of drug control agencies since that time, drug abuse continues to be a major problem. This chapter will provide background information needed to understand the DOD contribution to America's drug control strategy. First we will examine the direct and indirect costs of drug abuse on American society. Next we will take look at addiction, the keystone of the entire industry. Since the vast majority of illicit drugs are imported, we will then examine the sources of the three primary drugs of interest, marijuana, cocaine, and heroin. Finally, we will take a brief look at the U.S. coordinated drug control strategy.

Costs of the Drug Problem

Despite years of preventive education, the use of illegal drugs in the United States continues to exact extensive costs on our society. Direct costs tend to fall into two major areas. First is the increase in crime brought on by the illegal drug trade. Users commit theft in their attempt to raise money for drugs, and drug dealers are frequently associated with violent crime. Both types of crime greatly increase the cost of law enforcement. In

1994, for example, 66 percent of those arrested for crimes tested positive for drugs, while almost 60 percent of Federal inmates were drug offenders.[1] The second area where costs are increased by illegal drugs is health care. Long term drug users are subject to a large variety of health problems. In 1994, emergency rooms reported over one half million drug related visits, due in large part to the consequences of long-term drug abuse.[2] In addition, violent crime caused by the drug trade frequently results in trauma visits to emergency rooms. Finally, over 300,000 drug addicted babies are born every year, each requiring extensive medical assistance.[3]

In addition to the direct cost listed above, illegal drugs exact numerous indirect costs. In 1993, an estimated $49 billion was spent on illegal drugs.[4] This money could have been spent more productively elsewhere and, if still spent on consumer goods, could have generated over $3 billion in sales taxes. Even harder to quantify are social costs. Over 25,000 people die each year as the result of drug abuse.[5] Drug addicts have higher high school drop-out rates than the general population, making them less productive and less employable.[6] Finally, drug abuse has a negative impact on social structure of our families, communities, schools and workplaces, because "drug users make inattentive parents, bad neighbors, poor students and unreliable employees."[7]

Patterns of Addiction

In order to understand the illicit drug trade, we must first understand the keystone of the entire process—demand and addiction. Without demand and addiction, the entire system breaks down. There are two types of illicit drug users, casual users and addicts. For the casual user, ingesting drugs is a pleasant experience: he feels better (for a short

time) after taking the drug. Even though the experience is pleasurable, the casual user remains in control of his drug use, allowing himself drugs as an occasional treat. A casual user is defined as someone who uses illegal drugs less than once a week.[8] For reasons still not clearly understood, some (but not all) casual users become addicts. An addict is not in control of his drug use. For him, drug usage is a compulsion and the effect of ingesting the drug becomes somewhat the opposite of that experienced by the casual user. An addict feels miserable when he does not have drugs in his system and "normal" when he ingests drugs. The need for the drug becomes so compelling that an addict is consumed by his need for it and will do almost anything, regardless of the consequences, to get his drug. Although addicts represent only about one quarter of the total population abusing drugs, they are responsible for "most of the demand for illicit drugs and commit a disproportionate share of crimes to support their drug habits."[9] Specific details about marijuana, cocaine and heroin addiction can be found in Appendix A.

It seems reasonable that the illicit drug trade could be effectively undermined by reducing demand. This is the traditional method of fighting the drug problem and has been attempted in the U.S. since 1914. Demand reduction efforts include discouraging drug use by making drug possession illegal, educating the public about the hazards of drug use, creating drug treatment programs for addicts, and by general social disapproval. These efforts have never been successful in the long term.

Lack of success drove the government to seek other ways to reduce drug usage. Some observers noted that heroin abuse dropped sharply during World War II, when the supply was curtailed by the war. By applying the economic theory of supply and demand

to the drug trade, it was postulated, the street price of drugs could be raised enough to discourage use. This is why the U.S. turned more strongly to interdiction.

Sources of Illicit Drugs

Most marijuana, and all cocaine and heroin originate outside the continental United States. This provides numerous opportunities for interdiction. DOD interdiction efforts are directed primarily at cocaine, but effort is also directed towards heroin and marijuana.

Drug control agencies divide the western hemisphere into three zones with respect to the cocaine trade. North America and Puerto Rico are called the arrival zone. South America is the source zone and the area in between (all of Central America, the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico) is the transit zone. Cocaine is derived from the leaves of the coca plant, which is indigenous to the Andean region of Peru and Bolivia. Natives of this region have been chewing or brewing coca leaves for centuries for their mild stimulant effect (similar to that of a cup of coffee or tea).[10] In response to the demand for cocaine, farmers in the region now actively cultivate coca, which has become the primary cash crop of the region. Sixty percent of the world's coca is harvested in Peru and 35 percent is harvested in Bolivia. After harvest, most of the processing of the dried coca leaves into refined cocaine occurs in Columbia.

Cocaine trafficking is a vertically structured enterprise with only a few powerful, familial fiefdoms (usually called cartels) controlling all aspects of the trade from the harvest of the coca leaves, through processing, and transportation to the drug dealer that sells cocaine on the streets of America. Most of these cartels are headquartered in Columbia. Extracting cocaine from coca leaves is a crude process that requires lots of

water, so it usually occurs in the jungle near a river.[11] After the cocaine has been extracted, it is usually transported via river, air, or road vehicle to a central gathering point in Columbia. Because there are few roads in this area, most transport has been conducted using short air hops. This reliance on air has led to the designation "air bridge region" to the riverine area where Peru, Columbia and Bolivia meet. From Columbia, cocaine is most often transported by air and or sea (both commercial and non-commercial), either along the Eastern Pacific or through the Caribbean to northern Mexico. From northern Mexico it is usually smuggled across the southern border of the U.S. on the ground.

Colombian criminals are also involved in the heroin trade. Most of the heroin arriving in the United States comes from Burma and Afghanistan, but criminals in Columbia and Mexico, recognizing a potential lucrative market, are supplying increasing amounts of the drug. Unlike the small number of vertically organized cartels that control the cocaine trade, the heroin trade is conducted using a horizontal structure. A large number of secretive independent cells are responsible for different portions of the heroin trade. This makes the heroin trade much more difficult to successfully attack by removing traffickers. There are no "kingpins" to attack and removing members of a single cell has little effect. In addition, because of the wide variety of languages and dialects involved in the Asian heroin trade, intelligence gathering is considerably more difficult.[12] While heroin entering the U.S. from Mexico and Columbia follows the same pathways as cocaine, it is not controlled by the cartels. Mexican heroin is primarily transported by Mexican poly-drug traffickers with connections to Mexican-American criminal networks who control distribution. Colombian heroin is controlled by

independent traffickers. Heroin from Southeast Asia follows a myriad of pathways sponsored primarily by criminals with Chinese or Nigerian/West African connections.[13] Heroin from Afghanistan follows the same pattern as that from Southeast Asia, but it also travels west towards Europe, entering the Continent through Turkey.[14]

Seventy-five percent of the marijuana smoked in the U.S. is imported from Mexico. The rest is grown domestically.[15] U.S. grown marijuana was once considered inferior because of its low THC content (the intoxicating ingredient in marijuana). As the result of careful cultivation, the THC content of American marijuana has been increasing rapidly. Most American marijuana is grown in remote areas of Alabama, Hawaii, Kentucky, and California. Significant amounts are grown indoors as well.[16] Marijuana production and distribution is highly decentralized and varies from large vertically organized groups to small independent operations.[17]

The National Strategy

The stated purpose of the 1996 National Drug Control Strategy is "to break the cycle of addiction so that we can significantly reduce both illicit drug use and its consequences."[18] The strategy is broken into five goals, three oriented towards demand reduction and two oriented towards supply reduction. Each goal is further broken into three to six objectives (the complete listing can be found in Appendix B). Goal 1, "Motivate America's youth to reject illegal drugs and substance abuse,"[19] seeks to reduce the increased prevalence of drug use and substance abuse by our youth. Goal 2, "Increase the safety of America's citizens by substantially reducing drug related crime and violence,"[20] recognizes that most drug related crime is committed by hardcore users and

seeks to reduce the numbers of these hardcore addicts by linked treatment and enforcement programs. Goal 3, "Reduce health, welfare and crime costs resulting from illegal drug use,"[21] recognizes the health costs of drug abuse and seeks to increase treatment and education for all users and to reduce the spread of infectious diseases and other illnesses associated with drug use. Goal 4, "Shield America's air, land and sea frontiers from the drug threat,"[22] recognizes that most illicit drugs consumed in this country are imported and seeks to interdict this pipeline in the transit zone. Goal 5, "Break foreign and domestic drug sources of supply,"[23] seeks to stop drugs in the source zone by attacking both the crops themselves as well as the organizations responsible for delivering them. To summarize, the goals address the following areas (in order): education, law enforcement, treatment, transit zone interdiction and source zone interdiction.

In order to appreciate the relative emphasis placed on each area in the strategy, we must examine the budget. The total drug control budget for 1997 is $15.1 billion and is formally divided into four areas: Domestic Law Enforcement, Demand Reduction, Interdiction, and International.

Funds for Domestic Law Enforcement represent the largest share of the total budget at 55 percent of the total. Domestic Law Enforcement programs support investigations, prosecutions, corrections and regulatory/compliance programs, as well as provide assistance to local law enforcement agencies.[24]

The next largest share of the total budget goes to Demand Reduction, which gets 33 percent of the total. Demand Reduction programs include education programs, drug

treatment programs and research programs. The Clinton administration emphasizes this area in preference to interdiction.[25]

Interdiction, which is the primary area for DOD involvement, gets 10 percent of the total budget. Only about 50 percent of interdiction funds goes to the DOD; the rest goes to the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Customs Service and other organizations participating in the interdiction effort.[26] The purpose of interdiction is to intercept the drugs prior to their entry into the United States. This reduction in supply is then expected to drive up the street price and reduce the purity of illicit drugs being sold on the streets, in accordance with the economic theory of supply and demand.

International programs account for only 3 percent[27] of the total budget. These funds are directed to the Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement and to the Justice Department's Drug Enforcement Administration and are targeted primarily at breaking up international drug trafficking organizations and promoting alternative crops for farmers.[28]

As we can see, interdiction of both the transit and source zones represents a very small portion of the effort expended in the counterdrug effort. At a recent interdiction conference, the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Strategy, Barry McCaffrey, noted that at only 10 percent of his budget, interdiction was not an area where he intended to focus his attention. Instead, he intends to focus on demand reduction, which he feels has yet to realize the potential efficiencies and synergies of a well-coordinated interagency effort. He praised the efforts of the interdiction organizations and encouraged them to keep up the good work, but he also emphasized that no additional funding could be expected.

Another factor to consider when examining the small part that interdiction plays in the counterdrug effort is the size of the total effort, which is actually quite modest. As stated earlier, the estimated U.S. expenditures for illicit drugs in 1993 were $49 billion. In contrast, the budget for the National Drug Control Strategy in 1993 was $12.2 billion, less than one fourth the amount spent by drug users. There is no doubt that the U.S. government is serious about combating the use of illegal drugs, but fiscal realities place severe constraints on the level of effort expended.

Notes

[1]Colonel Charles I. Kasbeer, USAF, Director Task Group 4.2, JIATF–E, ACSC Briefing, 2 December 1996. 1994 is the latest year for which this information is available.

[2]The White House, *National Drug Control Strategy: 1996 (NDCS: 1996),* 41.

[3]Kasbeer briefing.

[4]*NDCS: 1996*, 41. This is the latest year for which this information is available.

[5]Ibid.

[6]Kasbeer briefing.

[7]The White House, *National Drug Control Strategy: 1989 (NDCS: 1989), 7.*

[8]*NDCS: 96,* 42.

[9]Ibid., 25.

[10]*NDCS: 89*., 29.

[11]Kasbeer briefing.

[12]Captain John S. Payne, USN, Chief of Staff, JIATF–W, interviewed by author in Washington D.C., 12 December 1996.

[13]*NDCS: 1996*, 50.

[14]Joint Pub 3–07.4, *Joint Counterdrug Operations, 9 August 1994, II–10.*

[15]*NDCS: 1996,* 50.

[16]U.S. Department of Justice, *Drugs of Abuse: 1996 Edition*, 35–36.

[17]*NDCS: 1996*, 50.

[18]Ibid., 19.

[19]Ibid., 22.

[20]Ibid., 24.

[21]Ibid., 27.

[22]Ibid., 30.

[23]Ibid., 33.

[24]Ibid., 60.

[25]Ibid.

[26]Ibid., 58–59.

Notes

[27]Does not add to 100 percent, due to rounding.
[28]Ibid., 60.

Chapter 3

DOD Involvement in Counterdrug Efforts

DOD counterdrug efforts focus almost entirely on interdiction. This interdiction effort includes air and maritime interdiction in the transit zone, ground interdiction along the southwest border of the U.S., and source nation interdiction. This chapter examines the scope of the DOD's contribution to the overall counterdrug effort by examining the history of DOD involvement and by describing how the interagency interdiction team is organized. Next it provides general descriptions of how interdiction is conducted for air, maritime, and ground interdiction, and the DOD efforts in source nation interdiction and in the heroin trade.

A Brief History

Although the military has been assisting in the drug control effort on an ad hoc basis since the 1930s, when U.S. Customs agents conducted surveillance from U.S. Army Air Corps aircraft, formalized use of the military is relatively recent. In 1981, Congress enacted legislation establishing exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act.[1] The Posse Comitatus Act dates from 1878 and states that members of the active and reserve Armed Forces may not perform law enforcement functions, such as search, seizure or arrest.[2] With the new law, Congress made it possible for military personnel to operate equipment

to monitor air and sea traffic, to intercept air or sea vessels operating outside the land area of the United States, and to direct them to a certain location. As a result, the military assisted law enforcement agencies with equipment loans, use of facilities, and drug-trafficking intelligence on a gradually increasing basis.[3] In 1989, President Bush declared a War on Drugs, and the role of the military began to increase significantly. The 1989 Defense Authorization Act directed the DOD to be "the lead agency for detecting and monitoring aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States."[4] It also directed the DOD to integrate the command, control, communications and technical intelligence assets of the United States into an effective communications network. In 1991, Congress expanded the DOD's counterdrug role to include nation building, as it authorized DOD personnel to participate in counterdrug operations with foreign personnel by providing training, support, and technical assistance to nations cooperating with our counterdrug efforts.[5]

As stated above, the number of military assets and personnel dedicated to the counterdrug effort increased dramatically after 1989. The timing for large-scale military involvement was excellent: the Cold War was drawing to a close, freeing up large amounts of assets, but the dramatic drawdown had not yet begun. Military effort was targeted primarily at the Caribbean portion of the transit zone. At one point, as many as 6–7 naval vessels patrolled the Caribbean in search of drug traffickers and 48 percent of all AWACS flying hours were dedicated to counterdrug missions.[67] Additionally, four Joint Task Forces were established, one each for USLANTCOM, USPACOM, and USSOUTHCOM, as well as one for FORSCOM.

In 1993, the Clinton Administration decided to reduce the number of assets dedicated to the interdiction effort, citing a lack of results. Overall, between FY92 and FY95, the DOD interdiction budget was cut by approximately 50 percent. This action was taken due to the Clinton Administration's decision to shift emphasis from transit zone interdiction in favor of Domestic Law Enforcement, Demand Reduction and International. The net effect of the DOD's cutbacks, as well as similar reductions in the interdiction efforts of the U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Customs Service has been a 53 percent reduction in the number of assets employed in support of our total interdiction effort in the transit zone. Not surprisingly, this reduction has also resulted in a decrease in drug seizures, which have been reduced proportionally.[8]

Agencies Contributing to the U.S. Interdiction Effort

One of the most difficult aspects of the national counterdrug effort is coordinating the efforts of the myriad of agencies involved, in order to maximize both efficiency and synergy. This was one of the motivations behind the creation of a National Drug Control Strategy. The FY97 budget for the National Drug Control Strategy shows funds going to 60 different agencies, and it does not differentiate between the numerous local law enforcement agencies.[9] As we narrow our focus to the agencies involved in interdiction efforts, we are left with three primary players (DOD, U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Customs Service) and numerous smaller ones. The smaller players include intelligence gathering agencies (CIA, DIA) and agencies from the Department of State and the Department of Justice.

When President Clinton shifted the emphasis of the counterdrug effort away from interdiction in 1993, he directed the Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy to "Review the multiplicity of command and control and intelligence centers involved in international counternarcotics and recommend steps to streamline the structure."[10] In turn, the SECDEF directed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff "to review the current CD [counterdrug] operational structure, evaluating the current designation of five designated counterdrug CINCs."[11] That review led to our current counterdrug interdiction structure, which is designated in the National Interdiction Command and Control Plan (NICCP). As a result of the review, seven regional command and control centers were consolidated into four, three of which were built from DOD organizations. Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATF-W) and Joint Interagency Task Force East (JIATF-E) were built from USPACOM's JTF5 and USLANTCOM's JTF4 respectively. USSOUTHCOM's Counterdrug Regional Operations Center was changed to JIATF-S. The fourth organization is the Domestic Air Interdiction Coordination Center (DAICC) at March AFB, California. The JIATFs are regionally oriented, aligned with their Unified Commands, but are intended to

> be national task forces . . . [which] provides for an organizational structure which recognizes the force multiplier effect that can be realized from a task force whose leadership is made up of Directors and Deputy Directors from the Department of Defense, the U.S. Customs Service and the U.S. Coast Guard.[12]

The JIATFs were charged with coordinating the detection, monitoring, and sorting of suspect aircraft and vessels, as well as the hand-off of these vessels to the appropriate U.S. or foreign law enforcement agencies. They were also charged with host nation support, as applicable.[13]

Due to the uniqueness of domestic law enforcement and to the limitations of Posse Comitatus, the DIACC is charged with responsibility of interdicting domestic air trafficking threats. It takes hand-offs from JIATF-E and other agencies and coordinates apprehension with the appropriate law enforcement agencies.[14]

The NICCP is currently under review, in response to the impending changes to the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and to the withdrawal of all U.S. forces, including USSOUTHCOM, from Panama. Under the new UCP, due to take effect in June 1997, the Caribbean will become part of USSOUTHCOM's area of responsibility. In 1998, USSOUTHCOM will move to Miami, Florida. Originally it was believed that JIATF-S would remain in Panama, however recent negotiations with the Panamanians make that unlikely. Additionally, unlike the other JIATFs, JIATF-S was never properly organized as a stand alone organization as envisioned in the NICCP. Instead, JIATF-S personnel are dual-hatted members of the USSOUTHCOM J-3 staff. Because of their organizational construction and their impending move to a location just north of JIATF-E, many observers are questioning the necessity of JIATF-S. They suggest JIATF-W be assigned all east-west traffic (heroin) and JIATF-E be assigned all north-south traffic (cocaine).

The Interdiction Process

The DOD participates in air, maritime, and land interdiction. Each medium has unique characteristics, but due to the extremely large areas involved, one characteristic they all share is reliance on intelligence. It is not feasible to cover 100 percent of the air

and maritime area in the transit zone or the entire 2,000 miles of the southwest border, so we rely on intelligence to help us position assets where they will do the most good.

Air Interdiction

The U.S. Customs Service has been involved in the air interdiction of drug traffickers since the late 1960s, when they created an Office of Aviation Operations. As their experience increased, they divided the interdiction process into five discrete elements: detection, sorting, interception, tracking, and apprehension.[15] The DOD is assigned the responsibility of "detection and monitoring," which corresponds to the first four steps of this process.

Detection, the first stage of air interdiction, is accomplished with radar surveillance.[16] The radar may be ground based, on a ship, or in the air. Ground based radar include AEROSTATS (located along the Southwestern border), USAF mobile radars (located at various locations in Central and South America), Relocatable Over the Horizon Radar (located at two CONUS locations) and CONUS Air Defense Radars. Ship based radar include various Navy ships. Air based radar include AWACS, Navy and U.S. Customs Service P-3s, and Navy E-2s.[17]

Potentially the most difficult step in the air interdiction process is sorting. In this phase, the tiny percentage of suspect aircraft must be identified from amidst huge numbers of legal air traffic. This is done by applying various criteria to all air traffic detected. An example would be an aircraft flying in Class A airspace (above FL180) without a transponder code, which is required in Class A airspace. Another example would be an aircraft that changes its transponder code without being directed to by Air Traffic Control. Once a track is identified as a potential suspect, coordination and

information gathering begins. For a suspect track in the Caribbean, personnel from JIATF-E in Key West, Florida manage this process. Using contacts in various foreign countries, they try to determine more information about the potential suspect: Is it under the control of an air traffic agency? Where did it take off from? Did it file a flight plan? What is its intended destination? If this coordination process continues to raise suspicions about the potential suspect, plans will be initiated for the next phase.

Interception is the third phase of the air interdiction process. During this step, Air National Guard or U.S. Customs aircraft intercept the suspect aircraft (preferably without being detected themselves) and fly close enough to identify the aircraft by type and tail number.[18] This information is passed to supporting agencies, who attempt to match the tail number to a known aircraft and, if necessary, initiate the coordination and planning for the apprehension phase.[19]

Once the aircraft is positively identified as a suspect, the tracking phase begins. Tracking is accomplished by a variety of methods. The preferred method is to continue following the suspect aircraft visually with another aircraft, again without detection. Suspect aircraft may also be tracked by various radar systems, as in the detection phase.[2021]

The apprehension step is the one step in the process that cannot be performed by a member of the Armed Forces. Only the U.S. Customs Service, the U.S. Coast Guard or National Guardsmen performing duties for their state may search, seize, and arrest suspects, because of the limitations of Posse Comitatus. In the event that a suspect aircraft (one that has passed through the first four steps of interdiction) enters the United States, the U.S. Customs Service usually takes the lead over other agencies in conducting

the apprehension. Their fleet of Blackhawk helicopters makes them ideally suited for taking over the final portions of the tracking phase and for conducting apprehension activities on rugged, poorly maintained airfields.[2223]

Maritime Interdiction

Maritime interdiction is conducted much the same as air interdiction. Radars (ground, air, and maritime) are used extensively for detection. Unlike aircraft, maritime vessels are not required to transmit a transponder code or talk to controllers; therefore the sorting phase must be conducted visually and by establishing radio contact. This step is often conducted by air assets, such as helicopters, who fly close enough to establish the identification and flag of the vessel. This information is compared to a database. The results of the database inquiry, coupled with visual indications and the crew's answers to questions over the radio, determine whether the vessel is suspect. Just as with air interdiction the third step is interception, but due to the nature of this medium, tracking is not a step in maritime interdiction. Once a vessel is intercepted, law enforcement officials board and conduct a search. If they find drugs, apprehension occurs immediately.[24]

Interdiction on the Southwest Border

JTF6, located at Ft Bliss, Texas, is responsible for the DOD effort directed at the nearly 2,000 miles of the southwestern border of the United States. This effort consists of small exercises, usually company sized, conducted by active, guard and reserve ground forces along the border. A unit is assigned a specific geographic area of responsibility (AOR) and inserted clandestinely, usually at night. It sets up and mans listening and

observation posts throughout its AOR, watching for drug smugglers. Due to the nature of ground interdiction, only the detection and tracking phases are conducted by DOD personnel. If smugglers are detected, law enforcement agencies are contacted and the suspects are tracked as they traverse the AOR. Only law enforcement personnel may intercept and apprehend suspects. Unfortunately, law enforcement personnel are spread thinly along the border and are frequently unable to respond in a time to apprehend suspects before they depart the AOR and cease to be tracked.[25]

Source Nation Interdiction

The DOD, through USSOUTHCOM's JIATF-S, is also involved in source nation interdiction throughout Central and South America. This assistance takes several forms, including training, technical support, and intelligence sharing. JIATF-S conducts training for law enforcement agencies and employs Mobile Ground Radar teams throughout its AOR. Recent efforts have concentrated on the riverine (or "air bridge") areas of northwest South America where cocaine processing occurs. Ground Mobile Radars assist in detecting aircraft transiting the air bridge area and small boats assist in detecting both the processing facilities and the transport of cocaine. In addition, intelligence sharing helps to focus the counterdrug efforts of host nation governments and law enforcement agencies.

DOD Involvement Against the Heroin Trade

USPACOM's JIATF-W, located in Alameda, California, concentrates its efforts on the heroin trade. JIATF-W, unlike JIATF-E, expends very little effort towards detection and monitoring. Their primary area of emphasis (over 50 percent of their budget) is

directed at dismantling the criminal organizations involved in the heroin trade in Southeast Asia. This is done primarily by intelligence sharing with both other U.S. Government organizations and host nations. Like JIATF-S, JIATF-W also dedicates considerable effort towards host nation support.[26]

Summary of the DOD's Contribution to the Interdiction Effort

While it is true that interdiction only contributes a small part to the overall effort, *The National Drug Control Strategy: 1996* clearly defines its purpose as "a visible sign of our Nation's commitment to fight drugs [which] has both a symbolic value as a demonstration of national will and real value as a deterrent to the flow of drugs."[27] The DOD makes two valuable contributions supporting that purpose. First, U.S. politicians have publicly stated that illicit drugs represent a threat to our national security; we underscore our seriousness by countering this threat with the use of the military. In addition, the visible use of military assets allows us to "lead by example" in our efforts to stimulate international cooperation to fight the drug war. Second, the military brings unique expertise and useful capabilities to the interagency interdiction effort. The military has unique expertise in command, control, communications, and intelligence (C^3I) and has been able to organize the C^3I efforts of the various interdiction agencies into a comprehensive team, enabling greater efficiency and synergy in the overall interdiction effort. The military also provides a number of useful capabilities with its specialized equipment, such as AWACS aircraft and AEGIS cruisers.

The military emphasizes coordinating its efforts towards achieving a measurable endstate in any operation. This (quite proper) emphasis on endstate causes great

frustration for military members and outside observers alike when applied to the military's efforts in support of the National Drug Control Strategy. First, the military's efforts are focused on interdiction, which represents only 10 percent of the overall effort expended. Interdiction demonstrates national will and raises the costs of drug trafficking, but has had no measurable effect on the quantity, price, or purity of drugs available on the streets of America. In addition, due to the limitations of Posse Comitatus, the military is unable to even participate in the endstate of the interdiction process: apprehension. This causes considerable frustration among military members as they detect and monitor suspected drug traffickers airborne in the transit zone or on the ground along the southwest border, only to see them get away because law enforcement personnel do not respond in time.

Notes

[1]Major Tim Boyles et al, "DOD Counterdrug Efforts," *An Analysis of DOD Counterdrug Efforts*, (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University, April 1994), 2.

[2]Major Dale E. Brown, USA, "Drugs on the Border," *Operational Structures Coursebook* (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University, 1996), 220.

[3]Bruce M. Bagley, "Myths of Militarization," *Drug Policy in the Americas,* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 132.

[4]Joint Pub 3–07.4, V–8.

[5]Boyles, 2.

[6]Cdr Richard W. O'Sullivan, telephone conversation with author, 2 October 1996.

[7]Brown, 218.

[8]Majority Staff, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, "Losing Ground Against Drugs," Unpublished report (Washington D.C.: December 19, 1995), 12.

[9]*NDCS: 1996*, 58–59.

[10]The Deputy Secretary of Defense, "DOD Guidance for Implementation of National Drug Control Strategy," (Washington D.C.: 27 October 1993).

[11]Ibid.

[12]Office of National Drug Control Policy, "National Interdiction Command and Control Plan" (Washington D.C.: April 1994).

[13]Ibid.

[14]Ibid.

Notes

[15]United States Customs Service Office of Aviation Operations (USCSOAO), "An Air Interdiction Primer," Unpublished report (Washington D.C.), 4.

[16]Ibid.

[17]Major Gary Georges, USAF, et al, "DOD Counterdrug Mission and Technology," *An Analysis of DOD Counterdrug Efforts*, (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University, April 1994), 34.

[18]USCSOAO, 4.

[19]William F. Daily, Jr., Chief of Staff, U.S. Customs Service Office of Aviation Operations, interviewed by author in Washington D.C., 13 December 1996.

[20]USCSOAO, 4.

[21]Dailey.

[22]USCSOAO, 4.

[23]Dailey.

[24]Cmdr Richard L. Clemmons, USN, ACSC student, interviewed by author, 4 March 1997.

[25]Major Fred Padilla, USMC, ACSC student, interviewed by author, 3 March 1997.

[26]Payne.

[27]*NDCS: 1996*, 30.

Chapter 4

Successes and Challenges in Drug Interdiction

In 1993, the Clinton Administration recognized that our interdiction efforts were not achieving their intended effect of reducing the quantity of drugs available on the streets of America. Despite seizing impressive quantities of drugs and achieving a significant disruption rate, price, purity, and quantity available remained stable.[1] The Clinton Administration recognized that interdiction had caused drug smugglers to change tactics, adopting different, and presumably more expensive, smuggling pathways. It further realized the value of interdiction as a demonstration of national will and for limited deterrence. However, it also understood the inherent limitations of achieving the interdiction endgame in the international arena, as well as the seemingly endless ability of drug traffickers to adjust their tactics in response to interdiction efforts. This chapter will review the ability of interdiction to successfully achieve deterrence by examining an air interdiction study conducted by the U.S. Customs Service. Next it will describe how drug traffickers have changed their tactics in response to interdiction efforts and the difficulties of measuring interdiction success, especially for the DOD. Finally, the two major challenges to interdiction, the profitablility of the illegal drug trade and international cooperation, will be examined.

An Example of How Interdiction Deters Smugglers



Figure 1. Deterrent Effect of Air Interdiction

Since it is neither possible nor practical to interdict every aircraft attempting to smuggle drugs into the United States, the U.S. Customs Service has conducted two independent studies to determine the practical level of success required to deter a significant percentage of potential drug smugglers.[2] Both studies concluded that successful interdiction of 25 percent of actual smugglers would result in the deterrence of 50 percent of the potential smugglers. Figure 1 shows the results graphically across the spectrum of effectiveness.[3] A statistical explanation for this becomes apparent when examined from the perspective of a smuggler pilot who intends to make multiple trips. Table 1 shows the increase in risk with each trip the smuggler pilot takes.[4] For the professional smuggler pilot, the cumulative risk of multiple trips becomes a powerful deterrent. An example of successful application of this principle can be seen from USSOUTHCOM's efforts in the air bridge region of northwestern South America, where comprehensive radar coverage coupled with successful law enforcement efforts by the

Peruvians, reportedly caused drug pilots to raise their fee for a single flight from $5,000 to $30,000.[5]

Table 1. Cumulative Probability of Apprehension

TRIPS	CHANCE OF APPREHENSION
1	25%
2	43
3	58
4	68
5	77
6	83
7	87
8	90
9	92
10	94

Changing Patterns in the Drug Trade

Although interdiction efforts have had little impact on the availability of drugs on the streets of America, these efforts have had a definite impact on the methods employed to smuggle drugs into the country. Prior to the increased interdiction efforts of the late 1980s and early 1990s, much of the illicit drugs entering the United States arrived via low flying private aircraft into nearly all of the southern states, with Florida as a particular favorite. During that period, the second most common method of introducing drugs into the U.S. was via private vessels.[6] Interdiction efforts shifted the preferred pathways from direct routes into the United States from South America, to indirect routing through northern Mexico. Increased interdiction has also shifted air and maritime traffic from the Caribbean to the Eastern Pacific, along the west coast of Mexico. Commercial transportation has always been a common method of smuggling Asian heroin into the United States, but with the widespread interdiction efforts in the Central American transit

zone, it is becoming a more popular method for smuggling cocaine and marijuana into the United States. The increased use of large shipping containers for maritime commercial transport has created a lucrative opportunity for drug smugglers. Over eight million of these large (40'L x 8.5'W x 8'H) steel containers enter U.S. ports annually, and only a tiny percentage (less than three percent) are inspected by U.S. Customs agents. Once again, intelligence plays a major role in our success, because of the ingenious ways that drugs are concealed within the legal contents of these shipping containers.[7]

How to Measure Success

The illegality of the drug trade makes accurate measurements extremely difficult along its entire spectrum, from the amount of raw product produced by farmers to the amount of finished product consumed by users. Various methods have been used to measure success. Certainly the most tempting metric is to measure the amount seized. The problem with this metric is that the amount seized has little relation to supply available on the streets, because in the drug trade supply greatly exceeds demand. For example, in 1995 about 230 metric tons of cocaine were seized worldwide, leaving an estimated 550 metric tons available to meet the U.S. demand of about 300 metric tons. Likewise, only 32 metric tons of the estimated 300 metric tons of heroin were seized worldwide, making it easy to meet the U.S. demand for about 15 metric tons.[8] This surplus of supply makes interdiction inexpensive for drug traffickers, since only about 10 percent of the street price is attributed to the cost of production and smuggling.[9] Two common metrics used by various federal agencies to determine the success of interdiction are street price and purity. These metrics depend on standard economic theory which

postulates that price will go up and purity will go down as supply is diminished. These metrics may have some validity for the overall interdiction effort, but are too far downstream of DOD efforts to be used as specific measures of success for the DOD. One of the biggest difficulties in determining a metric for DOD efforts can be seen by comparing its objective, detecting and monitoring, to its lack of control over the apprehension phase, which must be performed by law enforcement agencies, often in a foreign country. Therefore, the only way the DOD can measure success in its supporting role is by somehow determining how many total smugglers crossed the transit zone in a given time period and comparing that to the number who were detected and monitored. This is, in fact, exactly what is done. On a quarterly basis, an interagency working group meets to analyze the total number of smuggling events for the quarter. This number is then compared to the total number detected and monitored by JIATF forces.[10]

Profitability of the Drug Trade

One of the benefits to those involved in the drug trade (excluding the user) is it provides a guaranteed income. Farming is a notoriously risky line of work, yet coca farmers enjoy considerable security. The profit is not great, but in this impoverished area of the world, a coca crop represents the margin for survival. It also represents the margin for survival for the minions who process the coca leaves into cocaine and for those who participate in smuggling it into the U.S. The Government Accounting Office estimates that only about 10 percent of cocaine's street price is attributable to the costs of producing and smuggling.[11] Big profits occur during the distribution phase. One kilogram of cocaine, which costs $18–25 thousand wholesale, can be diluted six times and then sold

for $120–180 thousand.[12] Marijuana and heroin show similar patterns of profitability. A dollar's worth of Mexican marijuana can be sold for $100 dollars in the U.S.[13] A kilogram of pure heroin costs about $85,000 wholesale and can be divided into 35,000 envelopes which sell for $10 each ($350,000).[14] Farmers, processors and smugglers earn respectable wages, but the largest profits are gained by actual distribution.

In addition to providing the motive to enter into the drug trade, the profits earned by drug traffickers also create one of the biggest stumbling blocks to successful interdiction. Drug traffickers have plenty of money available to bribe law enforcement officials and judges, and to purchase the newest technology (such as GPS, cellular telephones, and night vision goggles). This puts the United States and the economically poor countries of Central and South America at a considerable disadvantage.

International Challenges

Probably the most significant challenge to winning the Drug War is its international nature. Nearly every country in Central and northern South America is involved as a grower, processor or transit point in the drug trade. In South America, drug trafficking organizations operate primarily in Columbia, Bolivia and Peru, but are also involved in Venezuela, Brazil and Ecuador. In Central America, organizations in Mexico are heavily involved in the drug trade, but drug traffickers also operate in Belize, Guatemala, Ecuador, Panama, Honduras, The Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica and Ecuador.[15] Although marijuana and heroin are both grown and processed in Mexico, Mexico's significance is that it is the primary conduit of illegal drugs into the United States via the

shared border between the countries. Government agencies estimate that 70 percent of the cocaine entering the United Stated enters through our shared border with Mexico.[16]

Of the phases of air and maritime interdiction discussed earlier, two phases are particularly dependent upon international cooperation: the sorting phase and the apprehension phase. The sorting phase relies heavily on information gained from foreign countries. Additionally, if the suspected trafficker lands in a country other than the United States or enters another country's territorial waters, the United States has no jurisdiction to apprehend them (or even to assist in an apprehension) and can only pass the information to the destination country and hope they have the will and the resources to make use of it.

Traditionally, source and transit nations have been uncooperative, considering the drug trade to be an "American" problem. If the U.S. would curb its demand for illegal drugs, they argue, the problem would correct itself. In recent years, however, many governments have begun to combat the drug trade for several reasons. First, they have begun to realize the threat that powerful drug cartels represent to their own ability to govern and control their respective countries. They also cooperate because of the "certification process" imposed by the United States. Each year, the President of the United States makes a judgment as to whether or not source and transit countries are cooperating in the counterdrug effort. Countries must be certified to receive aid from the U.S. Additionally, the U.S. votes against decertified countries if they seek international loans. Finally, the problem of drug abuse itself is not unique to the United States. Drug abuse, with its associated costs and problems, is becoming more common in the increasingly urban populations of Central and South America.

Although the assistance offered by the United States can be essential to success, aid carries potential political implications for both countries. The host nation must take care that its internal sovereignty is not threatened by an appearance of reliance on the United States. At the same time, the United States must ensure that information provided to the host nation does not result in human rights violations.

Notes

[1]United States General Accounting Office (GAO), "Increased Interdiction and Its Contribution to the War on Drugs," Testimony before the Subcommittee on Treasury, Postal Service and General Government, Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, (GAO/T–NSIAD–93–4).

[2]USCSOAO, 5–6.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Ibid.

[5]"Ground Based Radar: Eyes and Ears of Counterdrug Efforts," *USSOUTHCOM Report,* n.p.; on–line, Internet, 22 February 1997, available from http://www.dtic. southcom.gbr.html.

[6]*NDCS: 1989,* 73.

[7]William Weir, *In the Shadow of the Dope Fiend*, (North Haven, CT: 1995), 148.

[8]John Omicinski, "Study: Drug War Pricey, Ineffective" *Montgomery Advertiser*, March 10, 1997.

[9]GAO.

[10]Colonel Charles I. Kasbeer, USAF, Director Task Group 4.2, JIATF–E, interviewed by author, 2 December 1996.

[11]GAO.

[12]Kasbeer, briefing.

[13]Weir, 149.

[14]Omicinski.

[15]Souffront, Lt Colonel Luis and Major Mauro Di Gennaro, "Illicit Drugs in the Path to the United States—Counternarcotics Efforts in the Zone," ACSC Student Research Project, Unpublished paper, 1997.

[16]*NDCS: 1996,* 31.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

Criticisms of military involvement in the counterdrug effort have focused on three issues. Some critics have questioned whether the military should participate at all. Others have focused their questions on the way the military has been utilized. Most recently, critics have questioned the reductions of the use of the military since FY94, noting decreased success in the interdiction effort as measured by amount of drugs seized.

Those who criticize military participation fail to recognize the nature of the military's contributions to the overall effort. The first contribution is largely symbolic: the use of the military underscores our seriousness to U.S. citizens, drug traffickers, and international observers. The second contribution rests on unique military competencies of command and control, communications, and intelligence, and in the specialized equipment the military can bring to the counterdrug effort.

Those who criticize the way the military has been employed may not realize the limitations placed on the military by Posse Comitatus and international sovereignty. They may also be unfamiliar with the concept of MOOTW, where the roles of the military are often supporting roles that are far different from the military's traditional role of force employment. The military's assigned roles in the counterdrug effort, which are detection and monitoring, integrating the command, control, communications and intelligence

assets, and host nation support, are standard examples of MOOTW and should not be changed.

Finally, there are several reasons why the involvement of the military in the counterdrug effort does not need to be increased to previous levels. Critics who recommend an increase use the decrease in drug seizures as justification. This justification fails to recognize several issues. Excess capacity and low costs of production make interdiction losses both insignificant and inexpensive for drug traffickers. Additionally, the profitability of drug trafficking makes adaptation to interdiction relatively easy. Although the military makes valuable contributions, it is constrained by its inability to conduct the apprehension phase of the interdiction process due to Posse Comitatus domestically, and sovereignty internationally. Currently, law enforcement agencies, both domestic and international, often fail to complete the apprehension phase of suspect tracks identified by the military. Increasing the level of military involvement without first increasing the law enforcement presence along the southwest border and international cooperation in the transit zone would serve little purpose. During these limited fiscal times, it is important to realize the greatest value for money spent. The keystone of the drug trade is addiction; the entire process would collapse without the demand for drugs. That is why the current budget emphasizes demand reduction, and why those portions of the budget should not be sacrificed in favor of increased interdiction.

Appendix A

Description of Three Primary Drugs of Interest

Although many drugs are abused in the United States, marijuana, cocaine and heroin receive the most emphasis from both law enforcement agencies and the media. This section summarizes the abuse of each of these drugs, describing where and how each is obtained, how it is ingested by users, the effects it causes and the long term consequences of frequent abuse. This information is derived from two sources: *Drugs of Abuse: 1996 Edition* and *The National Drug Control Strategy: 1996.*

Marijuana

Marijuana is the most frequently used illicit drug in America and the easiest to obtain. It is derived from the leaves and flowering tops of the hemp plant, which grows wild in temperate and tropical climates. When the leaves and flowering tops are dried, they form a tobacco like substance which is then rolled into loose cigarettes and smoked. The active ingredient in marijuana is a chemical called THC. The effects felt by users vary with the amount of THC. Low doses bring a relaxed, dreamy state, sometimes accompanied with increased sensory perception. High doses may bring about a wide range of effects ranging from rapidly shifting sensory imagery to hallucinations with an altered sense of self-identity. Marijuana is not strongly habit forming. It causes moderate

psychological dependence and mild withdrawal symptoms. It is also associated with health problems similar to those suffered by tobacco smokers. Extended use can also cause damage to the reproductive system, suppression of the immune system and occasionally hallucinations and paranoia.

Cocaine

The 1980s saw a surge in the abuse of cocaine. Though frequently referred to as a narcotic, cocaine is properly classified as a stimulant. It is extracted from the leaves of the coca plant. Unlike marijuana, cocaine actually has a medicinal purpose. It was used for decades as a local anesthetic for eye, nose and throat surgery. Illicit cocaine comes either as a whitish powder (cocaine hydrochloride) or as hard crystalline chunks, known as "crack." Cocaine is usually snorted or dissolved in water and injected. Crack is ingested by smoking, which delivers such a large quantity of cocaine to the lungs that the effects are very intense, similar to intravenous injection. Because crack is inexpensive, only about $10 for a dose, its introduction coincided with a dramatic increase in drug abuse problems. As with marijuana, the effects vary with the quantity ingested. The most common effects are euphoria with increased alertness and excitation. Because cocaine is a stimulant, it also causes increased pulse and blood pressure. With crack, the onset of effects is almost immediate, but it does not last long and is followed by a precipitous crash. This leads to frequent repeated doses. An overdose of cocaine can cause agitation, fever, hallucinations, convulsions and sometimes death. Cocaine causes a high degree of psychological dependence and may cause physical dependence. Withdrawal symptoms include apathy, irritability, depression and disorientation.

Extended use can cause extreme respiratory problems, including severe chest pains with lung trauma and bleeding.

Heroin

While the abuse of all categories of illicit drugs is on the rise, there has been a sudden increase in the numbers of individuals trying heroin for the first time. Like all drugs derived from opium, the milky fluid that oozes from incisions in the unripe seedpod of the poppy plant, heroin is classified as a narcotic. Like cocaine, narcotics have legitimate medicinal properties. Other drugs have replaced cocaine for medicinal use, but opium products, such as morphine (to relieve severe pain) and codeine (to relieve moderate pain or to suppress coughing), are still very much in use for therapeutic purposes. Heroin is a semi-synthetic derivative of opium. In its pure form, it is a white powder. On the streets, this powder is usually mixed (or "cut") with a variety of similar-looking white powders, such as sugars, starch, or powdered milk. The heroin available today is purer than the heroin that was widely abused in the 1970s (35 percent pure, on average, versus 10 percent pure), and can therefore be inhaled. This option is more palatable to many users than the traditional method of injection and is contributing to its increasing popularity. A new form of heroin becoming available in the western U.S. is called "black tar" heroin. This crudely produced form of heroin is dark brown to black in color and may have a sticky tar-like appearance or be hard, like coal. Black tar heroin must be dissolved and injected. The effects of heroin are similar to those of barbiturates: euphoria and drowsiness. The effects are long lasting, compared to cocaine (3–6 hours versus 1–2 hours). The effects of overdose include slow and shallow breathing,

convulsions, coma and possible death. In addition to causing a high degree of psychological dependence heroin, like all opiates, causes a high degree of physical dependence as well. This causes withdrawal symptoms to be even more acute. Withdrawal symptoms include watery eyes, runny nose, irritability, tremors, panic, chills and sweating. The primary effects from extended use of heroin are caused by the impurities of the substances used to "cut" the purity and the non-sterile practice of injecting. These include abscesses on the skin, brain and/or lungs, as well as infectious diseases, like hepatitis and HIV.

Appendix B

The 1996 National Drug Control Strategy

Goal 1: Motivate America's youth to reject illegal drugs and substance abuse.

Objective 1: Increase the number of State governments and community organizations participating in the development of national prevention standards and a national prevention infrastructure.

Objective 2: Increase the number of schools with comprehensive drug prevention and early intervention strategies with a focus on family involvement.

Objective 3: Increase the number of community drug coalitions through a focus on the need for public support of local drug prevention empowerment efforts.

Objective 4: Increase, through public education, the public's awareness of the consequences of illicit drug use and the use of alcohol and tobacco by underage populations.

Objective 5: Reverse the upward trend in, marijuana use among young people and raise the average age of initial users of illicit drugs.

Goal 2: Increase the safety of America's citizens by substantially reducing drug related crime and violence.

Objective 1: Increase the effectiveness of local police through the implementation of community and problem-oriented policing with a focus on youth and gang violence, drug related homicides, and domestic violence.

Objective 2: Break the cycle of drug abuse and crime by integrating drug testing, court-authorized graduated sanctions, treatment, offender tracking and rehabilitation, and aftercare through drug courts and other offender management programs, prison rehabilitation and education, and supervised transition to the community.

Objective 3: Increase the effectiveness of Federal, State, and local law enforcement task forces that target all levels of trafficking to reduce the flow of drugs to neighborhoods and make our streets safe for the public.

Objective 4: Improve the efficiency of Federal drug law enforcement investigative and intelligence programs to apprehend drug traffickers, seize their drugs, and forfeit their assets.

Objective 5: Increase the number of schools that are free of drugs and violence.

Goal 3: Reduce health, welfare and crime costs resulting from illegal drug use.

Objective 1: Increase treatment efficiency and effectiveness.

Objective 2: Use effective outreach, referral, and case management efforts to facilitate early access to treatment.

Objective 3: Reduce the spread of infectious diseases and other illnesses related to drug use.

Objective 4: Expand and enhance drug education and prevention strategies in the workplace.

Goal 4: Shield America's air, land and sea frontiers from the drug threat.

Objective 1: Identify and implement options, including science and technology options, to improve the effectiveness of law enforcement to stop the flow of drugs into the United States, especially along the Southwest Border.

Objective 2: Lead efforts to develop stronger bilateral and multilateral intelligence sharing to thwart the use of international commercial air, maritime, and land cargo shipments for smuggling.

Objective 3: Conduct flexible interdiction in the transit zone to ensure effective use of maritime and aerial interdiction capabilities.

Goal 5: Break foreign and domestic drug sources of supply.

Objective 1: Destroy major trafficking organizations by arresting, convicting and incarcerating their leaders and top associates, and seizing their drugs and assets.

Objective 2: Reduce the foreign availability of drugs through eradication and other programs that reduce crop cultivation and through enforcement efforts to attack chemical, money laundering, and transportation networks that support trafficking organizations.

Objective 3: Reduce all domestic drug production and availability and continue to target for investigation and prosecution those who illegally divert pharmaceuticals and listed chemicals.

Objective 4: Increase the political will of countries to cooperate with the United States on drug control efforts through aggressive diplomacy, certification, and carefully targeted foreign assistance.

Objective 5: Strengthen host nation institutions so that they can conduct more effective drug control efforts on their own and withstand the threat that narcotics trafficking poses to sovereignty, democracy, and free-market economies. In source countries, aggressively support the full range of host nation interdiction efforts by providing training and operational support.

Objective 6: Make greater use of multilateral organizations to share the burdens and costs of international narcotics control to complement the efforts of the United States and to institute programs where the United States has limited or no access.

Glossary

AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System (E-3 Sentry)
CD	Counterdrug
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CONUS	Continental United States
DAICC	Domestic Air Interdiction Coordination Center
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
GPS	Global Positioning System
JIATF	Joint Interagency Task Force
JTF	Joint Task Force
NICCP	National Interdiction Command and Control Plan
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
UCP	Unified Command Plan
USLANTCOM	United States Atlantic Command
USPACOM	United States Pacific Command
USSOUTHCOM	United States Southern Command

Bibliography

Bagley, Bruce M. "Myths of Militarization: Enlisting Armed Forces in the War on Drugs." In *Drug Policy in the Americas.* Edited by Peter H. Smith. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992.

Beaty, Douglas R. *National Drug Control Strategy: A Strategic Analysis.* Carlisle Barracks, PA, April 1996.

Bechtold, Major Amy, USAF, et al. *An Analysis of DOD Counterdrug Efforts.* ACSC Academic Research Project. Air University, 1994.

Brown, Major Dale E., USA "Drugs on the Border: The Role of the Military." *Operational Structures Coursebook.* Air University: 1996, 216–222.

Deputy Secretary of Defense, "Department of Defense Guidance for Implementation of National Drug Policy," 27 October 1993.

Drugs of Abuse: 1996 Edition. U.S. Department of Justice. Washington D.C. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996.

Dunn, William H. *In Search of Measures of Effectiveness for Counterdrug Operations.* Carlisle Barracks, PA. Apr 93.

Flynn, Lt Stephen, USCG. "Worldwide Drug Scourge." *Operational Structures Course-book.* Air University: 1996, 204–215.

General Accounting Office. *Drug Control: Increased Interdiction and its Contribution to the War on Drugs.* Testimony before the Subcommittee on Treasury, Postal Service and General Government, Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate. Washington D.C.: GAO/T-NSIAD-93-4, February 1993.

"Ground Based Radar: Eyes and Ears of Counterdrug Efforts." *USSOUTHCOM Report*, n.p. On-line. Internet, 22 February 1997. Available from http://www.dtic.southcom.gbr.html.

Joint Pub 3-07.4, *Joint Counterdrug Operations*, 9 August 1994, II-10.

Majority Staff of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. "Losing Ground Against Drugs: A Report on Increasing Illicit Drug Use and National Policy," Unpublished paper, 19 December 1995.

Office of National Drug Control Policy. "National Interdiction Command and Control Plan," 7 April 1994.

Omicinski, John. "Study: Drug War Pricey, Ineffective." *Montgomery Advertiser*. Vol. 170:No 69 March 10, 1997.

Souffront, Lt Colonel Luis, DRAF, and Major Mauro Di Gennaro, DRAF. "Illicit Drugs in the Path to the United States—Counternarcotics Efforts in the Transit Zone." Student paper for ACSC, March 1997.

U.S. Customs Service Office of Aviation Operations. "An Air Interdiction Primer." Unpublished paper. Washington D.C.

Weir, William. *In the Shadow of the Dope Fiend: America's War on Drugs.* North Haven, CT: Archon Books, 1995.

The White House. *National Drug Control Strategy: 1989*. Washington D.C. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989.

The White House. *National Drug Control Strategy: 1996*. Washington D.C. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996.